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This paper has three goals.  First, it seeks to explain the origins of the Irish crisis.  
Second, it provides an interim assessment of the Irish government’s management of 
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1  Introduction 
 
Ireland is in the midst of a severe crisis. While the global financial crisis has affected 
all  economies  to  varying  degrees,  it  has  been  especially  severe  in  Ireland  with  a 
cumulative nominal GDP decline of 21 percent from Q4 2007 to Q3 2010. This ranks 
Ireland among the worst-affected countries in terms of output performance during this 
period (Lane and Milesi-Ferretti 2010). 
 
Allied  to  this  economic  shock,  Ireland  has  also  experienced  a  severe  fiscal 
deterioration. After a long period of running surpluses, the fiscal balance shifted from 
positive territory in 2007 to baseline deficits of 11-12 percent of GDP in 2009 and 
2010. Much of this fiscal deficit is structural in nature, such that the resumption of 
economic  growth  on  its  own  is  not  sufficient  to  restore  fiscal  sustainability.  In 
addition,  the  one-off  cost  of  recapitalising  the  banking  system  pushed  the  overall 
general government deficit to 14.5 percent of GDP in 2009 and 32 percent of GDP in 
2010, leading to rapid growth in the overall level of public debt. 
 
The main factor behind these developments has been the devastating boom-bust cycle 
in  the  Irish  property  market.  Since  the  property  boom  was  financed  through 
aggressive lending by the Irish banking system, the decline in property prices and the 
collapse in construction activity has resulted in severe losses in the Irish banking 
system. In turn, this has contributed to the economic crisis through a credit squeeze 	
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and  the  fiscal  crisis,  both  directly  through  the  costs  of  recapitalising  the  banking 
system and indirectly through the loss of asset-driven revenues. 
 
The scale of these problems meant that the sovereign spread on Irish debt rose sharply 
in 2010, with doubts concerning whether the government could achieve the triple play 
of restoring economic growth, fiscal sustainability and a healthy banking system. In 
the end, this resulted in a shift to official sources of funding in November 2010, with a 
three-year deal agreed with the IMF and the European Union.  
 
The primary goal of this paper is to describe what went wrong in Ireland, which is 
covered in Section 2. In addition, I review the Irish government’s management of the 
crisis since 2007 in Section 3. Next, I reflect on the role of Ireland’s membership of 
EMU during this episode in Section 4. Section 5 concludes. 
 
2  The boom and bust in Ireland 
It is important to appreciate that there was a genuine Irish economic miracle, with 
very rapid output, employment and productivity growth during the 1994-2000 period. 
This  period  can  be  interpreted  as  an  accelerated  convergence  phase,  with  Ireland 
catching  up  with  the  European  frontier  after  a  long  period  of  underperformance 
(Honohan and Walsh 2002). In particular, major policy mistakes in the late 1970s had 
led  to  an  unstable  macroeconomic  situation  that  resulted  in  a  sustained  phase  of 
economic stagnation. 
 
This period of stagnation came to an end with a sharp fiscal correction which was 
launched in 1987 with the agreement of the main political parties and accompanied by 	
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a new social partnership approach that provided a strong social consensus behind a 
cooperative approach to rebuilding the economy on a pro-business platform (see also 
Lane 2000). While the economy performed well in the late 1980s (supported by the 
boom in major export markets such as the UK and the US), this was temporarily 
halted by the 1992-1993 European recession and currency crisis. Accordingly, the 
sustained period of uninterrupted economic growth really only began in 1994. 
 
The remarkable economic performance during the 1990s was underpinned by multiple 
factors. The 1987 fiscal adjustment had delivered a stable fiscal situation, while the 
stagnation during the mid-1980s had eliminated the high inflation that had plagued 
Ireland in the late 1970s and early 1980s. Participation rates in second-level and third-
level education had sharply increased throughout the 1970s and 1980s, such that new 
entrants into the labour force had far higher human capital levels than those leaving 
the labour force through retirement. 
 
These positive domestic trends were accompanied by a favourable shift in the nature 
of  world  production  and  world  trade.  In  particular,  the  rise  of  the  ‘weightless’ 
economy,  in  which  ‘high-value,  low-weight’  sectors  such  as  computers  and 
pharmaceuticals  were  increasingly  important,  meant  that  Ireland’s  peripheral 
geographic status became less of a barrier to export-oriented production. The result 
was  a  boom  in  inward  foreign  direct  investment,  primarily  from  American 
multinational firms. In part, these firms selected Ireland as a platform for exporting to 
the newly-unified European single market. However, a substantial proportion of the 





With  FDI  providing  an  engine  for  productivity  growth,  domestic  components  of 
domestic demand also picked up, such that the economic expansion was very broad in 
its nature. Employment grew quickly with little pressure on wage rates, since there 
was  an  overhang  of  high  unemployment,  a  very  low  initial  level  of  female 
participation in the labour force and a large stock of Irish workers overseas that were 
ready to return home. 
 
While house prices began to grow strongly from around 1994, much of the initial 
growth in house prices could be justified by low initial property values (in the wake of 
the  1992/1993  currency  crisis)  and  the  rapid  growth  in  income  levels.  Moreover, 
credit expansion during the 1990s was also relatively restrained (Kelly 2010). 
 
The rapid pace of economic growth was reinforced during 1999-2000 by the sharp 
devaluation of the euro against the dollar, which boosted Irish exports. In addition, 
interest  rates  fell  in  Ireland  once  entry  into  EMU  was  confirmed  in  1997.  While 
Ireland undertook a revaluation in spring 1998 prior to the formation of EMU, this 
was very small in scale. Moreover, Ireland had attained full employment by this stage 
and strong upward pressure on wage rates became evident. 
 
There was also substantial fiscal expansion during 2000-2001, with a rapid increase in 
public spending and substantial cuts in taxation. While the ratio of public spending to 
GDP declined considerably during the rapid growth of the late 1980s, the timing of 
the fiscal expansion was procyclical. Accordingly, the initial years of EMU saw rapid 
growth but also a big surge in inflation, with Ireland appreciating against its fellow 	
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member states (Honohan and Lane 2003). 
 
The international recession in 2001 marked a turning point for the Irish economy. The 
expectation at the time was that Ireland would return to a more ‘normal’ European 
growth path, since the spare capacity in the labour force had been eliminated and the 
real appreciation meant that the marginal gains to foreign investors were diminishing 
(at least in labour-intensive sectors such as assembly or call centres). 
 
This  projection  was  wrong.  Rapid  economic  growth  resumed  in  2003  and  was 
maintained through 2007. However, the flavour of this boom was very different to the 
‘Celtic  Tiger’  years.  In  particular,  it  was  dominated  by  a  surge  in  construction 
activity,  with  the  economy  driven  by  a  boom  in  investment  in  housing  and 
commercial property. In turn, the positive wealth effect from rising property prices 
fed into strong growth in private consumption. With tax revenues from asset-related 
sources very strong, the government was also able to fund a strong pace of public 
expenditure growth, while maintaining a budget surplus and enjoying a rapid decline 
in the debt/GDP ratio. 
 
The  result  was  strong  growth  in  employment  but  with  little  productivity  growth. 
While  FDI  still  grew,  it  was  increasingly  targeted  at  higher-value  activities  that 
required  relatively  little  by  way  of  unskilled  labour,  even  if  this  sector  was  an 








Figure 1. Ratio of Private Credit to GDP. 
	
 ﾠ
Note: Ratio of private credit by deposit money banks and other financial institutions 
to GDP. Source: World Bank Financial Development Database. 
 
The expansion in property investment was fuelled by rapid credit expansion, with the 
ratio of private credit to GDP sharply increasing during 2003-2007 (see also Kelly 
2010).  Figure 1 shows the acceleration in credit expansion during this period. 
 
This expansion encompassed an increase in credit provision to the household sector 
but also to a small group of property developers. These property magnates acquired 
large and complex portfolios that included the building of new housing estates, retail 
outlets and office buildings. There was also intense competition to redevelop prime 
sites in Dublin, looking to replace existing structures with higher-density complexes. 






Figure 2.  Net Foreign Liabilities of Irish Banking System 
	
 ﾠ
Note:  Net foreign liabilities of domestic banking sector, expressed as a ratio to GDP. 
Source:  Author’s calculations, based on data from Central Bank of Ireland. 
 
In  addition  to  these  domestic  activities,  many  of  these  developers  were  also 
aggressive in international acquisitions, in the London prime real estate sector, the 
United  States  and  emerging  Europe.  (Irish  households  were  also  highly  active  in 
foreign property purchases, both holiday homes and buy-to-let properties.) 
 
Much of the credit growth was provided by local banks. In turn, these banks relied 
increasingly on international wholesale markets for funding, with a mix of short-term 
interbank funds and international bond issues.  However, there was also significant 
expansion  by  the  local  affiliates  of  UK-headquartered  funds.    The  increased 
competition in the market contributed to very low loan spreads and a loosening of 
loan documentation standards. Figure 2 illustrates the extraordinary expansion in the 	
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net foreign liabilities of the core Irish banks during this period. 
 
Figure 3 Current Account Balance 
	
 ﾠ
Note:  Ratio of current account to GDP. Source: Author’s calculations based on data 
from Ireland’s Central Statistics Office. 
 
 
Some standard feedback mechanisms amplified the boom. The collateral cycle played 
an important role with rising property prices improving the net worth of domestic 
investors, which in turn enabled extra leverage and a further impetus to the property 
market.  In  related  fashion,  the  high  profitability  of  the  domestic  banking  system 
enabled an expansion in the balance sheets of these institutions, with a major increase 
in net external liabilities. The overall current account balance shifted from near zero 
in 2003 to a deficit close to 6 percent of GDP in 2007, as is shown in Figure 3. 
 
The boost to tax revenues from asset-related sources enabled the government to add to 
domestic demand, including via a heavy programme of public investment. A new 	
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twist was the role played by inward migration from the new member states from 2004 
onwards. Inward migration helped to limit labour cost pressures in the construction 
sector, while the boost to population growth also added to investor confidence that the 
underlying demand for housing would continue to grow. 
 
Finally, the demand-led nature of the boom also contributed to a high rate of domestic 
inflation. Since this meant that the short-term real interest rate was low, it boosted 
borrowing and investment demand. In addition, it also boosted tax revenues due to the 
non-indexation of the tax system. 
 
There were clear signs that the property sector had passed its peak by autumn 2006. 
However, the hope was that there would be a soft landing by which the decline in 
property prices and construction-related activity would be gradual in nature and could 
be  offset  by  expansion  in  other  areas.  Indeed,  economic  activity  continued  to  be 
strong during 2007 such that the risk of a sharp crash did not seem immediate, even if 
the historical cross-country evidence signalled that the likelihood of a large decline in 
house prices was substantial (Kelly 2007). 
 
As  it  turned  out,  the  final  trigger  for  the  economic  collapse  was  the  shift  in 
international financial markets during 2007 and 2008.  By early 2008, the Irish banks 
found it more difficult to maintain funding in the international wholesale markets and, 
at the same time, there was a more rapid pull back by domestic investors from the 
property market.  This period of stress culminated in a full-scale crisis in September 
2008,  with  commercial  funding  for  the  Irish  banks  drying  up  in  the  wake  of  the 
disruption of international credit markets after the collapse of Lehman Brothers. Since 	
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then,  Ireland  has  grappled  with  a  triple  crisis,  with  a  severe  decline  in  economic 
activity, massive losses in the banking system and rapid deterioration in the fiscal 
position.
1  We turn to the management of the crisis in the next section. 
 
3  Crisis management 
 The economic crisis 
In relation to the real economy, the recession in Ireland in 2008-2009 was driven by a 
dramatic  decline  in  construction  investment,  with  the  sudden  reversal  in  Ireland’s 
fortunes also inducing a pull back in domestic consumption. In contrast to many other 
advanced economies, the export sector was a stabilising factor, with the decline in 
output concentrated in the domestically-oriented sectors of the economy. In a mirror 
image to the boom period, negative feedback mechanisms kicked in.  Banks pulled in 
lending, which in turn amplified the downturn in the property sector.  The increase in 
bad loans further curtailed the supply of credit by Irish banks.  
 
The decline in domestic demand also put downward pressure on the price level, with 
deflation contributing to the decline in tax revenues and an increase in the real burden 
of debt. Deflation was also partly driven by the sharp depreciation of sterling against 
the euro, in view of the importance of imports from the UK in Irish consumption, 
which constituted a terms of trade gain for Ireland. Between September 2008 and 
November 2010, the cumulative decline in the CPI was 6.2 percent.  Figure 4 charts 
the dynamics of real GDP and nominal GDP over 1998.4 to 2010.3, expressed relative 
to  aggregate  EMU-16  performance.    The  data  clearly  show  illustrates  the  greater 
amplitude of nominal GDP relative to real GDP, with strong relative output growth in 
the first decade of EMU accompanied by above-average relative inflation and the 	
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subsequent relative decline in output matched by a strong relative decline in inflation. 
 
Figure 1.  Real GDP and Nominal GDP, 1998.4 to 2010.3.   
 
Note:  Real GDP and Nominal GDP each expressed relative to aggregate EMU16 
values, normalised to 100 in 1998.4.  Source:  Author’s calculations based on data 
from Ireland’s Central Statistics Office and European Central Bank. 
 
 
The recession has led to a sharp increase in unemployment, which climbed from 4.6 
percent in 2007 to 13.3 percent in 2010. In addition, participation rates dropped and 
net emigration resumed, so that the total fall in employment was about 12 percent.  
With the decline in domestic demand, the current account has sharply improved, from 
5.6 percent of GDP in 2008 to 2.4 percent of GDP in 2010. 
 
The fiscal crisis 
The downturn in domestic spending and the decline in transactions in the property 
market meant that tax revenues fell very quickly, to the extent that the government 
had to introduce a series of measures to obtain other sources of tax revenue and limit 




This included the introduction of graduated income levies, which had the effect of 
sharply  increasing  the  marginal  income  tax  rate  for  middle  and  high  earners.  For 
public sector workers, pay levels were de facto reduced by the introduction of a public 
sector  pension  levy,  while  a  recruitment  freeze  was  also  implemented.    Further 
measures were taken in the 2010 budget (announced in December 2009), including 
further sizeable reductions in public sector pay levels, a reduction in social benefit 
levels and a contraction in spending commitments. 
 
These measures limited the scale of the decline in the fiscal situation. Even so, the 
underlying weak state of the economy and the collapse of the tax base meant that the 
baseline  fiscal  deficits  in  2009  and  2010  were  still  extraordinarily  large  at  11-12 
percent of GDP, even before taking into account the one-off costs of recapitalising the 
banking system.   
 
A sizeable proportion of the deficit is structural in nature.  A key problem is that 
elevated revenues from asset-related sources during the boom were in part deployed 
to reduce more stable types of tax revenue (see also Lane 2007). In particular, the 
direct tax burden on low and middle earners was significantly reduced during this 
period. In addition, the Irish tax base is quite narrow, with no significant role for 
sources  such  as  annual  property  taxes  or  local-level  taxes.  Accordingly,  a  major 
challenge is to expand the tax base.   
 
On  the  spending  side,  public  pay  levels  and  social  benefit  payments  had  been 
increased quite sharply during the good years. The initial phase of fiscal adjustment 	
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has already rolled back some of these gains. However, a 2010 agreement with public 
sector  unions  means  that  nominal  levels  of  public  sector  pay  will  not  be  further 
reduced  (barring  exceptional  circumstances),  with  savings  to  be  obtained  from  a 
combination of a recruitment freeze and productivity reforms in the delivery of public 
services. A saving grace is that the decline in the construction sector means that the 
cost  of  public  investment  projects  has  greatly  declined,  allowing  cuts  in  nominal 
investment spending far in excess of the decline in real spending. 
 
The fiscal tightening measures are certainly a procyclical force that has contributed to 
the scale of the recession.  It would have been better to have run larger surpluses 
during the good years and even accumulated a liquid rainy-day fund that might have 
been deployed as a buffer against the impact of the severe negative economic shock 
(Lane 1997, Lane 1998a, Lane 2010). 
 
Taken together, the cumulative size of the discretionary fiscal tightening over 2008-
2010 amounts to €14.6 billion, which is 9.3 percent of 2010 GDP.  In November 
2010, the government announced a four-year fiscal plan for 2011-2014 which would 
involve a further €15 billion in discretionary fiscal tightening. In turn, this four-year 
plan forms the basis for the fiscal component of the EU/IMF deal, which is further 
discussed  below.  Under  current  IMF  forecasts,  this  fiscal  austerity  package  is 
projected to stabilise the debt/GDP ratio by 2014 at 124 percent of GDP. 
 
The banking crisis 
In addition to the baseline fiscal problem, the sovereign balance sheet in Ireland has 
been further strained by the government’s role in resolving the crisis in the banking 	
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sector.  At the end of September 2008, the most immediate concern was to stabilise 
the banking system. At the time, the belief was that the main problem was the loss of 
market liquidity. Accordingly, the Irish government sought to improve the funding 
situation by guaranteeing the vast bulk of its liabilities for a two-year period (deposits, 
senior debt and dated subordinated debt). This was followed later in 2008 by the 
provision of extra capital for the banking system, as it became clear that losses on 
property-related loans would be greater than previously calculated. (However, these 
initial capital injections would prove small relative to subsequent estimates of the 
underlying  scale  of  potential  losses.)  In  April  2009,  the  Irish  government  also 
established the National Asset Management Agency (NAMA), with the mandate to 
purchase the universe of development-related loans (above a certain value) from the 
banks. 
 
This  triple-track  strategy  had  an  internal  coherence,  even  if  the  execution  of  the 
strategy turned out to be quite problematic in several respects.
2 One basic problem 
was  that  the  initial  guarantee  of  liabilities  was  too  broad  (Honohan  2010a).    By 
guaranteeing existing senior bonds and some types of subordinated debt, the capacity 
to allocate some part of the ultimate loan losses to bondholders was compromised, 
raising the taxpayer cost of resolving the banking crisis.  
 
In  relation  to  asset  transfers,  the  aim  was  to  cleanse  bank  balance  sheets  by 
transferring development-related loans to NAMA, since this category was the main 
source  of  uncertainty  concerning  total  loan  losses.    During  2009-2010,  NAMA 
purchased most of these loans at a steep average discount, such that the transfer also 
forced the banks to crystallise the losses on these loans. Under the guidance of EU 	
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rules, the discount has been applied on a loan-by-loan basis. Accordingly, there were 
substantial  transaction  costs  involved,  since  each  individual  loan  had  to  be 
individually assessed. Moreover, the cumbersome nature of this approach meant that 
the transfer of loans took place slowly, which inhibited the goal of a rapid cleansing 
of bank balance sheets. (Under the EU/IMF deal, the remaining transfers to NAMA 
do not require loan-by-loan appraisal.) 
 
While the asset transfer approach had the virtue of transparency, it also meant that the 
banks required substantial upfront recapitalisation programmes. Only one bank (Bank 
of Ireland) was able to raise significant new private capital, such that the State has 
ended  up  with  extensive  control  of  the  Irish  banking  system.    In  turn,  the  high 
recapitalisation costs led to a sharp increase in gross government debt and increased 
the  riskiness  of  the  sovereign  debt  profile,  in  view  of  the  ongoing  uncertainties 
regarding ultimate losses in the banking sector. 
 
While all banks have suffered considerable losses, the most extreme losses (relative to 
the size of loan books) were incurred by two marginal banks that have been revealed 
to have had very weak corporate governance.  The biggest offender has been Anglo-
Irish Bank, which was nationalised in early 2009. While it had little presence in the 
retail deposit market, this bank had grown very rapidly through aggressive property-
related lending which was largely funded on wholesale markets. The losses at this 
bank have been by far the largest contributor to the overall losses in the Irish banking 
system. In addition, a smaller mutual bank (Irish Nationwide Building Society or 
INBS) has also incurred catastrophic property-related losses.  However, the losses at 
the two main commercial banks (Bank of Ireland and AIB) and the tail-risk exposures 	
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of  these  banks  to  further  deterioration  in  the  economy  has  meant  that  the  entire 
banking system has been compromised. 
 
While the public capital injections into Bank of Ireland and AIB may be viewed as 
financial  investments  that  may  ultimately  yield  a  return,  the  capital  poured  into 
Anglo-Irish Bank and INBS is effectively a write-off. The capital transfers to Anglo-
Irish Bank and INBS pushed the overall 2009 general government balance to 14.5 
percent of GDP and the 2010 balance to 32 percent of GDP.   
 
The EU/IMF deal 
The  Irish  government  ultimately  requested  assistance  from  the  EU  and  IMF  in 
November  2010.  There  were  several  triggers  for  this  decision.    In  relation  to  the 
banking system, the expiry of the State guarantee in September 2010 led to an exit of 
private-sector funders that had committed funding under the guarantee. In turn, this 
resulted in a marked increase in the reliance of the Irish banks on liquidity support 
from the ECB and the extraordinary liquidity assistance facility of the Irish central 
bank.  Apparently, the view from the ECB was that this liquidity support could only 
be maintained if the process of downsizing the Irish banking system were accelerated 
and the capital ratios of the Irish banks further improved as a buffer against tail-risk 
losses.  
 
In addition, the projected level of property-related losses had increased over summer 
2010, with the discounts on the second tranche of loan transfers to NAMA greater 
than expected. In addition, the new management team at Anglo-Irish Bank decided to 
make extra provisions on non-NAMA loans, requiring further capital injections into 	
 ﾠ 18	
 ﾠ
Anglo-Irish Bank.  
 
 




Note:  Yield spread on ten-year government bonds. Source: Author’s calculations 
based on data from Global Financial Data. 
 
These extra capital requirements contributed to increased market concerns about the 
sustainability of the fiscal position. More generally, the surprise nature of the extra 
provisions underlined the extent of the uncertainty surrounding estimates of total loan 
losses in the Irish banking system and this tail risk pushed up the spread on Irish 
sovereign debt (Figure 5). 
 
Furthermore, a downward revision to the 2009 GDP data was announced in June 2010 
and the publication of lower growth forecasts in the IMF Article IV report in July 
2010 led to a re-assessment of the scale of the adjustment that would be needed to 
achieve a sustainable fiscal position. In part, these lower GDP forecasts related to a 
more pessimistic view of the impact of the financial crisis on the medium-term trend 	
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growth rate for the economy. However, an additional factor was a greater recognition 
that the adjustment process would involve a sustained real depreciation, in which the 
growth in the GDP deflator would be negative in the short-term and only increase 
slowly over the medium term, such that the five-year projection for nominal GDP was 
much lower than previously estimated. 
 
The total financial package under the EU-IMF deal is valued at €85 billion, which is 
about 54 percent of 2010 GDP for Ireland. However, €17.5 billion of the total is 
domestically sourced, from the assets held by Ireland’s sovereign wealth fund (the 
National Pension Reserve Fund) and the cash balances held by the agency responsible 
for managing the national debt (the National Treasury Management Agency). The 
external  component  of  €67.5  billion  is  evenly  split  with  €22.5  billion  from  the 
European  Commission’s  European  Financial  Stability  Mechanism  (EFSM);  €22.5 
billion  from  the  International  Monetary  Fund  (IMF);  and  €22.5  billion  from  the 
European Financial Stability Fund (EFSF) and bilateral loans (from the UK, Sweden 
and Denmark). 
 
In terms of composition, the intention is that €50 billion can provide funding to the 
Irish State, such that Ireland need not primarily rely on the bond markets to fund its 
fiscal  deficit  or  roll  over  existing  debt  over  the  next  three  years.  (Although  the 
programme does require Ireland to have partial access to market funding from 2012 
onwards.)  In  relation  to  the  banking  system,  €10  billion  is  to  be  drawn  down  to 
provide  extra  capital  to  the  Irish  banking  system  (€8  billion)  and  fund  credit 
enhancements that are intended to allow the Irish banks to sell packages of risky loans 
to private investors (€2 billion). The final €25 billion is contingent funding that can be 	
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drawn down if its turns out that the Irish banking system requires yet further capital in 
the coming years. 
 
The agreed programme involves discretionary fiscal tightening of €15 billion over 
2011-2014, with €6 billion of this total to take place in 2011. Under an optimistic 
growth scenario, this might deliver a budget deficit to GDP ratio in 2014 that is just 
under the 3 percent limit. However, the programme recognises that a lower growth 
path would not see the 3 percent target achieved by 2014. Under that scenario, the 
programme envisages that further tightening will be required in 2015, in order to 
achieve the 3 percent target. 
 
The combined interest rate across the different funding lines is of the order of 5.8 
percent per annum for a 7.5 year loan. While this is in line with standard IMF funding 
conditions, it is arguable that the European component of the funds could have been 
priced  at  a  lower  rate.  While  it  is  certainly  important  that  such  official  funding 
contains a premium to discourage moral hazard, the 300 basis point premium built 
into this funding rate makes it more difficult to achieve fiscal sustainability. This 
limits the degree of solidarity across EU partners, while also increasing the risk facing 
other European governments in view of the potential contagion from doubts about the 
sustainability of the Irish sovereign position.  
 
Although  the  context  is  quite  different,  it  is  striking  that  the  December  2010 
agreement between Iceland and the UK and Dutch governments on the Icesave debt 
specifies an interest rate of 3.2 percent over a long repayment period, with the interest 
rate  calculated  to  approximate  the  cost  of  funds  for  the  creditor  governments. 	
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Similarly, the balance of payments support provided by the European Commission to 
EU member countries outside the euro area (Hungary, Latvia) does not carry a similar 
penalty premium. 
 
In terms of structural reforms, the main objective under the deal is to de-risk the 
banking  system  (see  also  Honohan  2010c,  Honohan  2011).  This  involves  several 
elements. First, the extra capital injections are intended to increase in core Tier 1 
capital ratios to 12 percent. Second, the level of risky loans held by the banks are to 
be reduced through the transfer of extra property loan tranches to NAMA and the sale 
of loan packages to private investors. (As indicated above, the sale of loan packages 
to private investors will be supported by €2 billion in credit enhancements to limit the 
risk exposure that would otherwise deter private investors.) Third, the banks will be 
further downsized through the disposal of affiliates and other non-core assets. Fourth, 
the winding down of the main disaster banks (Anglo-Irish Bank and Irish Nationwide 
Building Society) will be accelerated. Fifth, the €25 billion in contingent funding 
provides an additional buffer in the event of extra loan losses. 
 
Finally, these financial measures will be accompanied by a more extensive third-party 
assessment of the quality of the loan books. While the Irish central bank published a 
prudential capital assessment review (PCAR) in March 2010 that set out conservative 
provisions  for  loan  losses  (this  was  updated  in  September  2010),  the  level  of 
uncertainty about loan quality means that further information disclosure is necessary 
in order to improve market understanding of the likely distribution of loan losses. 
Furthermore, the role of third-party assessors in examination of the loan books is seen 
as important in guaranteeing the rigour of the 2011 PCAR exercise. If it turns out that 	
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the review signals that extra bank capital is advisable, this is allowed for under the 
terms of the EU/IMF funding. 
 
Taken together, the goal is that these banking sector reforms will result in a smaller, 
less-risky and better-capitalised banking system. In turn, these changes improve the 
sustainability of the ECB liquidity provisions and also increase the likelihood that the 
Irish banks can return to the private wholesale funding markets.  
 
An important issue in the negotiation of the deal was the appropriate scale of burden 
sharing by bank bondholders in the recapitalisation of the Irish banking system. If the 
holders of bonds issued by the Irish banks absorbed some of the losses, the fiscal 
burden  would  be  lightened.  It  seems  that  there  were  about  €32  billion  of  non-
guaranteed bank bonds outstanding at the time of the EU-IMF deal, consisting of €12 
billion of subordinated debt and €20 billion of senior debt. These are bonds that were 
issued  before  the  introduction  of  the  September  2008  guarantee  (which  has  now 
expired) but have not yet reached their maturity dates. In addition, about €25 billion 
of  guaranteed  senior  bonds  have  been  issued  under  the  2009  Eligible  Liabilities 
Guarantee scheme for new debt issuance.
3 (A small amount of new non-guaranteed 
bonds has also been issued.) 
 
The EU-IMF deal envisages that holders of subordinated debt will not be repaid in 
full. There is currently a bond exchange programme for the Anglo-Irish subordinated 
debt which offers the bond holders 20 cents on the euro. Over the last two years, there 
have been other voluntary exchange programmes for subordinated debt holders in 
several banks, with an estimated €7 billion obtained in discounts. (It is arguable that 	
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these earlier exchange programmes were premature in that the appropriate level of 
discount  could  not  be  properly  determined  before  the  full  systemic  evaluation  of 
prospective loan losses had taken place.) 
 
However, it also seems that there was serious discussion of writing down the value of 
some non-guaranteed senior bonds as part of the IMF/EU negotiations. While the 
legal tradition in Ireland has been to view senior bonds as pari passu with depositors, 
it seems that there may be legal options to break that link. For instance, in situations 
in which the scale of State capital injections exceeds the pre-crisis level of capital, it 
may  be  possible  to  argue  that  senior  bondholders  should  have  no  legitimate 
expectation of full repayment. 
 
However,  no  agreement  was  reached  for  restructuring  the  non-guaranteed  senior 
bonds.  Media  reports  indicate  that  European  policymakers  took  the  view  that  the 
restructuring of senior debt would create a new precedent in European banking that 
could severely disrupt bank funding markets. However, the counter-argument is that a 
set of objective criteria could be developed that would clearly delimit the scenarios 
under which some types of senior debt should be written down, thereby limiting the 
scope for contagion.  
 
Indeed, the working document of European Commission (2011) identifies a range of 
possible criteria, even if the scope of the European Commission report is restricted to 
the  design  of  future  bank  bond  contracts,  rather  than  to  altering  the  payoffs  on 
existing bank debt.  Moreover, to the extent that the restructuring of senior bank 
bonds improves the sovereign fiscal position, it might even be a calming influence on 	
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sovereign debt markets. The ultimate treatment of the non-guaranteed senior bank 
bonds  remains  an  unresolved  issue  and  is  set  to  feature  in  the  political  debate 
surrounding the upcoming general election in Ireland. 
 
In terms of other structural reforms, the main priority is to improve the operation of 
the  labour  market  in  order  to  facilitate  a  reversal  in  the  sharp  increase  in 
unemployment (much of it now long-term) since the onset of the crisis. The minimum 
wage (set at the peak of the boom) has been reduced by 12 percent, while there has 
been a further 4 percent decline in unemployment benefits. In addition, more vigorous 
labour market activation policies are envisaged under the plan and other types of 
rigidities in the wage setting system will be targeted. In relation to product markets, 
there are aspirations to reduce monopoly rents in sheltered sectors (such as the legal 
and medical professions) and boost productivity in the public sector. 
 
However, the growth payoff from such reforms may occur with a long lag and cannot 
be relied on to improve growth substantially within the period of the deal. Similarly, 
public sector reform has the potential to boost efficiency considerably, but the overall 
growth payoff will only occur over a long period. Accordingly, it is not realistic to 
expect a sizeable direct short-term growth payoff. 
 
Overall,  the  EU/IMF  deal  provides  an  environment  in  which  Ireland  can  make 
progress  in  resolving  its  crisis.  However,  there  are  considerable  implementation 
challenges in delivering the planned fiscal adjustment (see also Beetsma et al 2009).  
In  addition,  the  cost  of  restructuring  the  banking  system  remains  uncertain  and 




Both the debt dynamics and the health of the banking sector are dependent on the rate 
of nominal GDP growth in the coming years. In this regard, there is considerable 
uncertainty about the path for GDP. The Irish finance ministry and the main local 
economic forecaster (the ESRI) are relatively optimistic about the speed of output 
growth, pointing to the capacity for a small open economy to rely on export-driven 
growth and the high current levels of precautionary savings that should decline once 
uncertainty declines and consumer confidence recovers. Against that view, the cross-
country historical evidence is that output growth is typically very slow after major 
banking crises, even if these historical examples do not precisely match the current 
Irish conditions (Reinhart and Reinhart 2010).  
 
Having reviewed the course of events in Ireland, we now turn to asking some general 
questions about the lessons to be drawn from the Irish experience in relation to the 
impact of EMU on member countries. 
 
4  Ireland and EMU 
At  a  surface  level,  it  is  possible  to  argue  that  membership  of  EMU  has  directly 
contributed to the boom-bust cycle in Ireland.
4 First, Ireland entered EMU at the peak 
of the Celtic Tiger output boom, with full employment only recently achieved and the 
emergence of shortages in the labour market. Accordingly, the initial conditions for 
Ireland were quite different than for the aggregate euro area economy.   
 
A standard prescription in this case is to revalue the exchange rate prior to entering 
the monetary union, such that price level pressures in the economy are diverted into 	
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nominal exchange rate appreciation rather than a differential post-entry inflation rate.  
While Ireland undertook a small revaluation in spring 1998, this was inadequate given 
the scale of the boom.
5 Accordingly, the undervalued conversion rate between the 
Irish pound and the euro contributed to the inflationary pressures in Ireland in the 
early years of EMU. 
 
Second, the creation of EMU itself represented an asymmetric shock.  In particular, 
while the core member countries had experienced a convergence in interest rates long 
before the formation of EMU,  there was a substantial decline in interest rates for 
peripheral member countries such as Ireland, Portugal, Spain and Greece in the late 
1990s. For these countries, a history of devaluations meant that there was a substantial 
country risk premium in interest rates. Moreover, the smaller countries suffered from 
a low level of liquidity in their money and currency markets, such that a liquidity 
premium  was  also  incorporated  into  the  level  of  interest  rates  in  these  countries. 
Accordingly, EMU represented a major economic shock for them, since devaluation 
risk and currency liquidity risk were eliminated.  As such, holding fixed other factors, 
households,  firms  and  governments  in  these  countries  now  faced  a  permanent 
reduction in the cost of capital. In turn, this triggered an expenditure boom in these 
countries (see also Fagan and Gaspar 2007). 
 
Third, by virtue of its greater involvement in extra-EMU trade, Ireland was more 
affected by shifts in the external value of the euro than was the case for other member 
countries. In particular, the sharp depreciation of the euro against the dollar during 
1999-2002 represented a positive differential shock for Ireland vis-à-vis the rest of the 
euro area, since the strong economic linkages between Ireland and the United States 	
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meant that Irish competitiveness was boosted by more than in other countries. This 
contributed to the already-strong aggregate demand conditions in Ireland during that 
period and the positive inflation differential between Ireland and the rest of the euro 
area (Honohan and Lane 2003).  More recently, the rapid depreciation of sterling 
against the euro during autumn 2008 has affected the Irish economy more than other 
regions in the euro area. 
 
Fourth, the effective segmentation of national banking systems that remained even 
after the formation of EMU meant that shifts in market structure in the Irish banking 
system posed a challenge for the domestic financial regulator.  In particular, aggregate 
credit growth in Ireland was boosted by the rise of Anglo-Irish Bank as an aggressive 
lender to property developers, which in turn induced a relaxation of lending standards 
by other participants in the Irish loans market (Honohan 2009, 2010a, 2010b). In 
similar  fashion,  greater  competition  from  the  affiliates  of  UK  banks  further 
contributed  to  rapid  domestic  credit  growth.  In  turn,  this  domestic  credit  boom 
contributed to faster expansion in Irish aggregate demand relative to other members of 
the euro area and increased country-specific risks in the banking system. 
 
Fifth, there have been major shifts in government spending and taxation in Ireland 
relative to other members of the euro area since 1999. Membership of a monetary 
union is perfectly consistent with a wide range of variation in terms of the ratios of 
government spending and tax revenues to GDP. However, the timing of the fiscal 
expansion was procyclical in nature, such that fiscal policy tended to amplify cyclical 





Sixth, the asymmetric liberalisation of EU labour markets to migrants from the new 
member states in 2004 represents a further idiosyncratic shock. In particular, Ireland 
was the only member of the euro area to open its labour market to workers from 
Central and Eastern Europe and only the United Kingdom and Sweden adopted a 
similar  approach  among  the  existing  members  of  the  EU.  The  scale  of  post-
liberalisation migration far exceeded ex-ante expectations, acting as another structural 
shock for the Irish economy that was not shared by its fellow members of the euro 
area. 
 
Taken together, these country-specific factors meant that macroeconomic stability in 
Ireland required effective national stabilisation policies.  However, there was a failure 
to  regulate  the  banking  sector  to  guard  against  systemic  risk  factors.  This  was 
especially problematic under EMU, since access to the area-wide financial markets 
meant  that  the  scope  for  Irish  banks  to  take  on  too  much  risk  was  amplified. 
Moreover, the operation of fiscal policy was insufficiently counter-cyclical. These 
twin policy weaknesses both failed to curb the boom and exacerbated the scale of the 
crisis.  
 
The weaknesses in banking regulation have been extensively analysed in two major 
reports that were commissioned by the Irish government (Honohan 2010a, Regling 
and  Watson  2010).  As  a  follow  on  to  these  reports,  a  banking  inquiry  has  been 
established to further probe into these regulatory failures.  This should prove helpful 
in  establishing  in  more  detail  the  factors  that  contributed  to  the  banking  crisis. 
However, major required reforms have already been implemented, with new senior 





In  relation  to  fiscal  policy,  there  were  both  macroeconomic  and  microeconomic 
weaknesses (see also Lane 2010). While budget surpluses were run during the boom 
period,  these  were  relatively  small  and  the  scale  of  the  structural  deficit  was 
systematically underestimated (by both domestic and international agencies). On net, 
the fiscal position was fundamentally fragile, despite appealing headline numbers. In 
relation  to  microeconomics,  the  tax  system  during  the  boom  period  provided 
excessive incentives to invest in property - and these distortions amplified the cycle. 
 
Accordingly, the lesson is that the fiscal system needs to be redesigned in order to be 
more robust in the event of future shocks. A broader tax base should help to provide a 
more stable platform for tax revenues, while the setting of tax rates should be counter-
cyclical or at least acyclical. In relation to the fiscal balance, the crisis has illustrated 
that a small open economy such as Ireland should run much bigger surpluses during 
boom periods in order to provide fiscal space during downturns. An important current 
debate is whether formal fiscal rules and a role for an independent fiscal council can 
facilitate a more countercyclical pattern for fiscal policy (Lane 2010). Indeed, the 
EU/IMF deal includes a commitment to introduce a Fiscal Responsibility Law and a 
Budgetary Advisory Council in the first half of 2011. 
 
The  failure  to  implement  appropriate  national  stabilisation  problems  meant  that 
Ireland took excessive macroeconomic risks during the early years of EMU.  In turn, 
membership of a currency union limits the range of options that can be pursued in 
emerging from the current crisis. However, along some dimensions, membership of 	
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the euro area has also provided considerable stability during this crisis period. Most 
directly, the Irish banks have heavily relied on the liquidity provided by the European 
Central Bank as a substitute for the loss of access to private wholesale funders.  In 
addition, highly-indebted Irish households have benefited from low ECB interest rates 
during the crisis. 
 
Had Ireland not joined the euro, the foreign liabilities of the banking system would 
most likely have been in foreign currency and the banking crisis would have been 
amplified by a parallel currency crisis. Moreover, an independent currency would not 
have offered a guarantee against the onset of the mid-2000s credit boom.  This credit 
boom affected many non-EMU economies in Europe (Iceland, Central and Eastern 
Europe) and many countries have experienced the problems associated with currency 
overshooting that can act to amplify the impact of credit booms, only to be followed 
by a deeper crash with currency depreciation exacerbating balance sheet problems. 
Moreover, even under an independent monetary policy, it is not clear that the central 
bank would have been able to neuter the housing boom solely through its interest rate 
policy, in view of the weak relation beween interest rates and housing prices and the 
potential output costs of targeting asset prices ahead of real indicators (Dokko et al 
2011). 
 
Of course, there are some attractions to an ‘immaculate’ devaluation by which a one-
off  realignment  of  the  Irish  real  exchange  rate  could  provide  a  boost  to  exports. 
However,  as  is  exhaustively  documented  by  Eichengreen  (2010),  there  are 
considerable financial and logistical disruptions associated with seeking to exit the 
euro. In view of Ireland’s very deep level of international financial and economic 	
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integration, these transition costs might be especially high.    
 
Moreover,  the  longer-term  attractions  of  an  independent  currency  remain  open  to 
question for the reasons given above.  Such problems would be especially severe for a 
new currency created in the wake of exiting EMU, since the credibility of the new 
monetary regime and its anti-inflation commitment would be queried by the markets. 
Accordingly, the monetary regime for a new Irish currency would likely require an 
initial phase of relatively high interest rates. 
 
In terms of the broader reform of the institutional framework for the euro area, the 
failures in domestic macroeconomic policy and financial regulation during the pre-
crisis  period  mean  that  the  proposals  by  the  European  Commission  for  tighter 
surveillance are welcome in terms of reducing the risk of future crisis episodes. 
 
However, the absence of an EU-wide special resolution regime for failing banks has 
made it more difficult and more costly to resolve the Irish banking crisis. In relation to 
future  crises,  the  types  of  proposals  currently  being  developed  by  the  European 
Commission  should  help  (for  instance,  in  allowing  for  the  bailing  in  of  senior 
unsecured bond holders in the event of severe bank losses) but these are too late to be 
helpful in resolving the current crisis. More broadly, the creation of the European 
Systemic  Risk  Board  and  the  associated  European  Supervisory  Authorities  should 
help in monitoring European-wide risks in the financial system. 
 
While the creation of the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) has facilitated 
the funding of the IMF/EU programme for Ireland, the size of the penalty premium 	
 ﾠ 32	
 ﾠ
built into the interest cost is arguably too stiff for a fund that is built on the principles 
of solidarity and common financial interests among members of the euro area, since it 
is sufficiently high to non-trivially increase the risk that the sovereign will ultimately 
run into repayment difficulties.  
 
Furthermore, the EFSF can only provide loans to member governments. In terms of 
promoting financial stability, a more flexible mechanism that could also offer tail-risk 
insurance might have been better suited to tackling the underlying fiscal exposure of 
the  Irish  government  in  relation  to  resolving  the  Irish  banking  crisis  (see  also 
Honohan 2011).   
 
The current proposals for the permanent European Stabilisation Mechanism (ESM) 
that will replace the EFSF in 2013 do not extend the remit of the ESM to include this 
type of risk sharing mechanism. However, the greater clarity about the potential for 
burden sharing by bondholders under the ESM should prove helpful in providing 
greater  market  discipline  in  relation  to  future  fiscal  management.  However,  the 
uncertainty  about  the  transition  towards  the  ESM  arrangements  is  a  source  of 
instability in dealing with the current sovereign debt crisis.  
 
5  Conclusions 
The  2003-2007  property-driven  boom  has  proven  to  be  very  costly  for  Ireland, 
resulting  in  a  deep  recession,  a  severe  fiscal  crisis  and  the  near-collapse  of  the 
banking  system.  While  the  frothy  state  of  international  financial  markets  and  the 
under-pricing  of  risk  certainly  played  a  role  in  fuelling  the  boom,  the  primary 
responsibility for curbing excesses lay with domestic policymakers. In this regard, 	
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there  was  a  twin  failure  with  the  financial  regulator  losing  control  of  systemic 
financial risk, while fiscal policy was insufficiently counter-cyclical.  
 
By  the  same  token,  although  the  2007-2008  international  financial  crisis  was  the 
proximate trigger for the hard landing in the domestic property market, the unwinding 
of the boom was bound to happen at some point, even if the nature of the inevitable 
adjustment might have been different under alternative realisations.  
 
At a domestic level, a primary lesson from the Irish crisis is that it reaffirms the 
principle that rigorous discipline in fiscal policy and financial regulation is essential if 
membership  of  a  currency  union  is  to  be  compatible  with  macroeconomic  and 
banking stability. At an EU level, the Irish crisis has highlighted the costs of the 
incomplete institutional design of the monetary union and the importance of deep-
level  reforms  both  to  reduce  the  probability  of  future  crises  and  to  increase  the 






1The  crisis  in  Ireland  has  other  dimensions,  including  the  damage  to  Ireland’s 
international reputation and a loss of confidence among the domestic population in the 
2 Other approaches to resolving the banking crisis were also debated. For instance, the 
pre-emptive nationalisation of the banking system was advocated by many domestic 
economists and also raised by the 2009 IMF Article IV mission.  
3The main focus of the debate is on the non-guaranteed bonds, since a restructuring of 
guaranteed bonds would have broader implications for sovereign debt. 
4This section draws on Lane (2009). 
5Lane  (1998a)  recommended  that  Ireland  undertake  a  much  larger  revaluation. 
Slovakia revalued by 15 percent in 2008 before it joined EMU at the beginning of 
2009. 
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